Between the optimist and the pessimist it is normally assumed a distinction based on some sort of exaggerated speculation and this is why the realist thinks himself above both the optimist and the pessimist. For, the realist believes himself to have some kind of privileged access to the Real and determines both the optimist and the pessimist to be mere fantasists relying on pure subjective speculation concerning possible future outcomes and events.
What the so called realist fails to realise, ironically, is that he has no more access to the Real than anyone else.
The optimist is not an optimist because he speculates about the future in an unrealistically positive way; likewise, the pessimist is not a pessimist because he speculates negatively. In fact, pessimism and optimism are badly understood in terms of speculation.
to be sure, the optimist may speculate negatively; for example, the optimist may think that the outcome of some future event will be, for want of a better word, negative or detrimental; yet, through this speculation the optimist will make his peace with the negative outcome and meet it optimistically.
The pessimist, on the other hand, may indeed speculate positively only to meet the actualisation of the event pessimistically.
This is merely to show that the optimist and pessimist are ‘types.’ (note: the optimist and pessimist are both engaged in a creative process, and active engagement with reality… the so-called realist does not produce anything (if such a one exists). The ‘realist’ allows ‘reality’ to happen to him, whereas the optimist, and, to a more problematic degree, the pessimist, produces reality.)
How does this relate to nihilism? Well, the nihilist has a ‘realisation’ that there is no essential meaning or value to life (or existence in general)… that is, this value is no more or less valuable than any other (essentially speaking…) Now, does this realisation leave room for optimism. Can the optimist meet this speculation, in the form of a sense, optimistically?
In the first place, it is no good to simply abstract nihilism from the agent that has this sense. Every nihilism is a nihilist, after all. Nihilism must be embodied in an agent, because it is a sense (not a theory – [however, nihilism can be put into a theory but this is only an abstraction of nihilism]… and this is why the agent must be distinguished as a ‘type.’ (we understand nihilism poorly indeed if we think of it as a truth – and just as badly as if we think of it as a set of consistent ideas directly translatable into logical generality.)
Nihilism itself is merely a sense, an uneasy sense sometimes, a mood… this is why nihilism is housed within a type and that the type is defined by action and action defined specifically as optimistic or pessimistic. Each nihilist, optimistic or pessimistic, acts in accordance to their type. Each acts to affirm their own sense of the essential valuelessness of existence (a sense that can only be articulated by an act of affirmation). The pessimistic nihilist will withdraw from life in an act of affirmation (not apathy) because the pessimistic nihilist determines this course of action to be the ‘best’ one. Now, if the pessimistic nihilist chooses the ‘best’ or even the lesser of two evils, he is making a judgment of value. Thus, the pessimistic nihilist is creating value (other than this the pessimistic nihilist will simply be actionless, but even then, if this were possible, one would have to still say that this is a course of action and we would still have to ask the question, “why have you chosen to be actionless (or, willess) and entirely determined [and in this case we should want to define the nihilist not as a pessimistic nihilist but rather a fatalistic nihilist, with only our own particular view of this fatalistic nihilism will have the character of pessimism]). The optimistic nihilist does the same, yet, he does not withdraw from life, he meets life head on; even if he negates that life he meets it such only to affirm himself, ‘his’ life. The optimist constantly begins, the pessimist constantly ends. Both constantly create value by affirming their sense of nihilism.
At any point we try to determine the one course of action as ‘better’ than another, be it pessimistic rather that optimistic, or optimistic rather than pessimistic, we too are giving a value to the one rather than the other or vis versa. In which case, any speculation concerning nihilism is doomed to failure by virtue of the fact that nihilism defies generality (as love defies generality also – love as a sense not emotion).
In fact, there is no such thing as a ‘true nihilist’ because this again would imply a value, a hierarchy of nihilists… how absurd. This means that we can only define the nihilist by his sense (this sense can be generalised as again the sense of love too can be generalised)… however, we can not determine the nihilist by his actions, because the nihilist, by definition (relating to the generalisation of the sense), may choose whatever he wills and remain consistent with his sense of nihilism.
I have this nihilistic sense that everything is essentially valueless. However, i choose to act outwardly. To push out into the world and out into life. And as before, because one’s love for someone has no essential value it doesn’t mean that we can not be the creator of that value. One might ask, “but what of the values you create? are these not also essentially valueless?” And the answer is “yes, of course. However, i choose to affirm them regardless and this choice is no better or worse than any other but it is mine; and whether it is essentially valueless or not i shall affirm it and make it positive and self-productive.” [I would just like to point out here that I have dwelt here on values, although, this could be replaced by any other negation such as meaning, purpose, aim, etc. in relation to the generalisation of the sense of nihilism]
in conclusion, nihilism is a sense and as such can be defined in general terms as a sense. It is the sense that life and existence in general is essentially valueless [again, this could also be ‘meaningless,’ ‘without’ ‘purpose,’ ‘without aim,’ etc.]. Anyone can have this sense. And we have divided (rather crudely) nihilists into two types: the optimistic nihilist and the pessimistic nihilist. The optimist affirms life by creating value and meaning and the pessimist affirms only his sense of life’s essential valuelessness. Neither affirmation can be regarded by any nihilist as any better or any worse than any other without negating their own sense of nihilism (which every nihilist does constantly – the nihilist may have the sense that no value is more valuable than any other, yet, the optimistic nihilist will endeavor to affirm his own created values as more valuable than all others – the nihilist that does not do this is a stoic or even quietist… these again have there place in nihilism but here we are only interested in the optimist and the pessimist). So, the question is not can the nihilist be optimistic? but rather, why does the nihilist choose this course of action rather than another if he really has a sense of the valuelessness of existence? And again we have the answer of creation of values and the embodiment of nihilism within a type. The optimistic type experiences the sense of nihilism as an opportunity for creation; the pessimistic nihilist sees nothing of this opportunity… the pessimistic nihilist is not the creative type. The optimist too affirms negation in the sense that he may say no to the old values etc. but this is only so that he can create a clear space to erect his own values and as long as he affirms those values will have value. To affirm a value is to give it value.
